



1 Initially, I was not an admirer
of the Andersen-Jordan study,
but later my evaluation jumped
up considerably, as can be seen
from McCallum (1986).  Right
from the start, however, I was
one of the many analysts who
were stimulated into active
research in the area by that
paper’s bold and innovative use
of statistical tools to examine









t is a great privilege for me to be giv-
ing this year’s Homer Jones Memorial
Lecture, in recognition of Homer Jones’s
outstanding role in the development of
monetary policy analysis.  I did not know
him personally, but I have been very strong-
ly inﬂuenced by economists who knew and
admired him greatly—Karl Brunner, Milton
Friedman, and Allan Meltzer come to mind
immediately.  My work has also been inﬂu-
enced by writings coming from the research
department of the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, which he directed, and by the
availability of monetary data series devel-
oped there.
For this lecture I originally had planned
a title of “The Evolution of Monetary Policy
Analysis, 1973-1998.”  As it happens, I have
decided to place more emphasis on today’s
situation and less on its evolution.  But, a
few words about history may be appropriate.
I had chosen 1973 as the starting point for 
a review because there was a sharp break in
both academic analysis and in real-world 
monetary institutions during the period
around 1971-73.  Regarding institutions, 
of course, I am referring to the breakdown
of the Bretton Woods exchange-rate system,
which was catalyzed by the U.S. govern-
ment’s decision in August 1971 not to
supply gold to other nations’ central banks
at $35 per ounce.  This abandonment of the
system’s nominal anchor naturally led other
nations to be unwilling to continue to peg
their currency values to the (overvalued)
U.S. dollar, so the par-value arrangements
disintegrated.  New par values were painfully
established during the December 1971
meeting at the Smithsonian Institution, but
after a new crisis, the system crumbled in
March 1973.
In terms of monetary analysis, the
starting date of 1973 has the disadvantage of
missing the publication in 1968 and 1970 of
the Andersen-Jordan (1968) and Andersen-
Carlson (1970) studies, which many of you
will know were written at the St. Louis Fed
under the directorship of Homer Jones.
These studies were, to an extent, a follow-
up to the Friedman-Meiselman (1963) 
paper, which had set off a period of intel-
lectual warfare between economists of a 
then-standard Keynesian persuasion and
those who were shortly (Brunner, 1968) to 
be termed “monetarists.”1 But my reason 
for beginning slightly later is that the years
1971-73 featured the publication of six
papers that initiated the rational expectations
revolution.  The most celebrated of these is
Lucas’s (1972a) “Expectations and the 
Neutrality of Money,” but his other papers
(1972b) and (1973) also were extremely
inﬂuential as were Sargent’s (1971 and 1973).
The sixth paper is Walters (1971), which 
had little inﬂuence but was, I believe, the 
ﬁrst publication to use rational expectations
(RE) in a macro-monetary analysis.
At ﬁrst there was much resistance to 
the RE hypothesis, partly because it initially
was associated with the policy-ineffective-
ness proposition.  But, it gradually swept 
the ﬁeld in both macro and microeconomics,
primarily because it seems extremely impru-
dent for policy analysis to be conducted
under the assumption that any particular
pattern of expectational errors will prevail 
in the future—and ruling out all such
patterns implies RE.
There were other misconceptions
regarding rational expectations, the most
prominent of which was that Lucas’s famous
“critique” paper (1976) demonstrated that
policy analysis with econometric models
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2Here I have in mind the promo-
tion of a class of overlapping-
generations models in which
the asset termed money plays
no medium-of-exchange role.
3 Actually, writings in this litera-
ture typically express their
analysis as pertaining to
economies featuring monop-
olistic competition.  In typical
cases, most of the results are
independent of the extent of
monopoly power, which then
could be virtually zero.
was a fundamentally ﬂawed undertaking.
Actually, of course, Lucas and Sargent
showed instead that certain techniques
were ﬂawed, if expectations are indeed
rational, and that more sophisticated tech-
niques are called for.  But by 1979, John
Taylor, last year’s Homer Jones lecturer,
had demonstrated that these techniques
are entirely feasible.  Nevertheless, this
misunderstanding—and others con-
cerning the role of money2—led to a 
long period during which there was a 
great falling off in the volume of sophis-
ticated, yet practical, monetary policy
analysis.  One reason was the upsurge 
of the real-business-cycle (RBC) approach
to macroeconomic analysis, which in its
standard version assumes that price adjust-
ments take place so quickly that, for prac-
tical purposes, there is continuous market
clearing for all commodities, including
labor.  In this case, monetary policy actions
will, in most models, have little or no
effect on real macroeconomic variables at
cyclical frequencies.  Of course this has
been a highly controversial hypothesis and
I am on record as ﬁnding it quite dubious
(McCallum, 1989).  But my attitude is not
altogether negative about RBC analysis
because much of it has been devoted to 
the development of new theoretical and
empirical tools, ones that can be employed
without any necessary acceptance of the
RBC hypothesis about the source of
cyclical ﬂuctuations.
In recent years, in fact, these tools
have been applied in a highly promising
fashion.  Thus a major movement has 
been underway to construct, estimate, 
and simulate monetary models in which
the economic actors are depicted as
solving dynamic optimization problems
and then interacting on competitive
markets,3as in the RBC literature, but 
with some form of nominal price and/or
wage “stickiness” built into the structure.
The match between these models and
actual data is then investigated, often by
standard RBC procedures, for both real
and monetary variables and their interac-
tions.  The objective of this line of work 
is to combine the theoretical discipline of
RBC analysis with the greater empirical
validity made possible by the assumption
that prices do not adjust instantaneously.
Basically, the attempt is to develop a 
model that is truly structural, immune 
to the Lucas critique, and appropriate 
for policy analysis.
As a consequence of this movement,
and some other activities to be mentioned
shortly, the state of monetary policy analysis
today (March 1999) is remarkably different
than it was only a few years ago.  Most of
the changes are clearly welcome improve-
ments, although some are of more debatable
merit.  Let me now describe central aspects
of the current situation before turning to an
evaluation and an application.
One striking feature of research on 
monetary policy today is the extent of inter-
action between central-bank and academic
economists and the resulting similarity of 
the research conducted.  This feature is illus-
trated nicely by the contributions to two
recent conferences entitled “Monetary Policy
Rules.”  The ﬁrst of these was sponsored by
the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER), held January 17-18, 1998, in Islam-
orada, Florida.  The second, held June 12-13,
1998, in Stockholm, was jointly sponsored
by the Sveriges Riksbank (the Swedish cen-
tral bank) and the Institute for International
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In Table 1, the ﬁgures on contributors clearly
indicate that both academic and central-bank
participation was substantial, but they do not
begin to tell the whole story.  They do not
show, for example, that four of the papers
were authored jointly by one economist 
from each group.  Nor do they reveal that
two of the designated academics were central
bankers until very recently; that three others
had (like the St. Louis Fed’s William Poole
and Robert Rasche) moved in the opposite
direction; or that currently one is both a
leading professor and a member of the Bank
of England’s Monetary Policy Board.  The fact
that several academic participants are regular
central-bank consultants is also not shown.
But to get the full ﬂavor of the extent
to which central-bank and academic mon-
etary analysis has done away with distinc-
tions that were important only recently,
one needs to read the papers.  It is my
impression that if the authors’ names 
were removed, one would ﬁnd it extremely
difﬁcult to tell which group the author or
authors came from.  To me, this intense
interaction seems to represent a very posi-
tive change, and is one toward which several
regional Federal Reserve Banks (including 
St. Louis) have contributed greatly.
In the research presented at these two
conferences there was not just a similarity of
technique across groups, but also a consid-
erable amount of agreement across authors
about the outline of an appropriate frame-
work for the analysis of monetary policy
issues.  Such agreement can be dangerous,
of course, but it certainly facilitates commu-
nication.  In fact, there remains room for
quite a bit of substantive disagreement
within the framework, so on balance I 
ﬁnd this similarity somewhat encouraging.
In any event, I would like to describe this
framework and then take up some major
issues that I hope you will ﬁnd interesting.
The nearly standard framework at the
NBER and Riksbank conferences is a quanti-
tative macroeconomic model that includes
three main components.  These are:
• An IS-type relation (or set of rela-
tions) that speciﬁes how interest-
rate movements affect aggregate 
demand and output; 
• A price adjustment equation (or set 
of equations) that speciﬁes how 
inﬂation behaves in response to the 
output gap and to expectations 
regarding future inﬂation; and 
• A monetary policy rule that speciﬁes 
each period’s settings of an interest-
rate instrument.  
These settings typically are made in
response to recent or predicted values of
the economy’s inﬂation rate and its output
gap.  A leading example of such a rule will
be considered at length shortly.  Most of
these are quarterly models and most incor-
porate rational expectations.  They are
estimated by various methods, including
the approach called “calibration,” but in 
all cases an attempt is made to produce a
quantitative model in which parameter
values are consistent with actual time-
series data for the United States or some
other economy.  These models are intended
to be structural (i.e., policy invariant) and 
in some cases this attempt is enhanced by 
a modeling strategy that features explicit
optimization by individual agents acting 
in a dynamic and stochastic environment.
To study effects of policy behavior,
stochastic simulations are conducted using
the model at hand with alternative policy
rules, with summary statistics being calcu-
lated to represent performance measured by
average values of the variability of inﬂation,
the output gap, and interest rates.  A few of
the models are constructed so that each sim-
ulation implies a utility level for the repre-
sentative individual agent; in such cases,
utility-based performance measures can be
calculated.  In several studies, effort is taken
to make the policy rules operational, which,
with an interest instrument, means a realistic
speciﬁcation of information available to the
central bank when setting its instrument.
In discussing in more detail the com-
ponents of this framework, it will be useful
to have an algebraic representation of a
simple special case.  Here I will use yt to
denote the natural logarithm of real gross
domestic product (GDP) during quarter t,
with 
_
yt being the capacity or potential or
natural rate value of yt.  Then , yt =  yt - 
_
yt
is the output gap.  Also pt is the log of NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1999
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4These authors include Kerr and
King (1996), McCallum and
Nelson (1999), and Woodford
(1995).
5 The references are Calvo (1983)
and Rotemberg (1982).
6 It can be veriﬁed easily that
equation 2 implies that if policy
generates inﬂation such that
E(Dpt - Dpt-1) ¹ 0, then
E(yt -
_
yt) ¹ 0.  
7 One of the few relations with
price stickiness that satisﬁes
the NRH is my own favorite,
the P-bar model  used by
McCallum and Nelson (1999).
Its weakness is that it does not
yield as much persistence in
inﬂation as appears in the data.
8 Typiﬁed by Dpt = a1Dpt-1




9 See, e.g., the symposium 
in the winter 1997 issue of 
the Journal of Economic
Perspectives.
10The term “non-accelerating-
inﬂation rate of unemploy-
ment” suggests a relationship
between Dpt - Dpt-1 and 
yt -
_
yt in immediate contra-
diction to the NRH.
the price level so Dpt is the inﬂation 
rate while gt represents real government
purchases and Rt is the level of the short-
term nominal interest rate used as the
central bank’s instrument.
(1) yt = b0 + b1 Etyt+1 + b2(Rt - EtDpt+1)
+ b3(gt – Etgt+1) + vt
(2)     Dpt = a1EtDpt+1 + (1-a1) Dpt-1
+ a2(yt - 
_
yt) + ut
(3)      Rt = – r + EtDpt+j + m1 (EtDpt+j - p
*)
+ m2 (yt - 
_
yt) + et
Here Et zt+j is the rationally formed
expectation at time t of the value of z that
will prevail in period t+j, so EtDpt+1 is the
expected inﬂation rate and Rt - EtDpt+1 is
the one-period real rate of interest.  The
terms vt, ut, and et represent random distur-
bance factors that impinge on the choices 
of individuals and the central bank; these
are not observable to an econometrician.
The parameters designated b, a, and m do
not change with time, unlike the variables
that carry the subscript t.  All parameters
except b2 are presumed to be positive.
Relation 1 is a so-called IS function in
which b2 is a negative number, reﬂecting 
the hypothesis that the real rate of interest
has a negative effect on demand; higher real
interest rates tend to depress spending by
households and ﬁrms.  If b1 = 0, then the IS
function would be one of the textbook Key-
nesian variety that is somewhat lacking in
theoretical justiﬁcation.  With b1 = 1, how-
ever, we have a forward-looking “expecta-
tional” or “intertemporal” IS relation of 
the type several authors have shown to 
be implied, under reasonable conditions, 
by optimizing dynamic behavior.4 With 
this latter type of relationship, the proper
appearance of government purchases is 
as shown in equation 1.  This is of some
interest, for it implies that if changes in 
gt are approximately permanent, then an
upward jump in gt will be offset by an
upward jump in Etgt+1, leaving demand
unaffected.  That type of phenomenon 
may be the reason that many investiga-
tors have obtained econometric results
suggesting that government purchases
have insigniﬁcant explanatory power 
for aggregate demand.  
The price-adjustment equation 2 is
written so as to accommodate either the
entirely forward-looking Calvo-Rotemberg
model,5 in which case a1 = 1, or a two-
period version of the Fuhrer and Moore
(1995) model (with a1 = 0.5).  Neither of
these, I would point out, satisﬁes the strict
version of the natural rate hypothesis (NRH)
due to Lucas (1972b), which postulates that
monetary policy cannot keep yt > 
_
yt perma-
nently by any sustained scheme of behavior.
(More precisely, the NRH implies that E(yt - _
yt) = 0 for any policy rule.6)  I personally
consider this violation to be a weakness, 
an indication that speciﬁcation 2 is faulty.7
But both the Calvo-Rotemberg and Fuhrer-
Moore models are more attractive (and
plausible) in that regard than the NAIRU
class,8 which gets more attention from the
press and practical commentators, for the
latter class implies that an increasing
inﬂation rate will keep output high forever
(in contrast to either of the mentioned
versions of 2).  That the press—and even
some professional publications9—fails to dis-
tinguish between the NRH and the NAIRU
concept is, in my opinion, slightly disgraceful,
especially since the very term NAIRU suggests
an incompatibility with the NRH.10
The third component of this simple
system is the monetary policy rule that is
shown in equation 3.  It suggests that with
m1 and m2 positive the central bank will raise
Rt, thereby tightening policy, when inﬂation
exceeds its target value p
* and/or when
output is high relative to capacity.  Thus
equation 3 has been written in approxi-
mately the form suggested by Taylor (1993),
which has come to be known as “the Taylor
rule.”  I will have quite a bit to say about that
rule below, but for the moment I wish to take
up the point that the system (equations 1-3)
does not include a money demand-function.
Indeed, it does not refer to any monetary
quantity measure in any way whatsoever.  
To anyone steeped in the tradition of Homer
Jones, this strikes a rather dissonant note.  
So let’s take a minute to consider whether
this is sensible.NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1999
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T o do that, suppose that we add to the
system a standard money demand function.
Let mt be the log of the money stock, either
the monetary base or M1 depending on
whether or not a banking sector behavior 
is included.  Then we have
(4)       mt – pt = g0 + g1yt + g2Rt + et
where et is the random component of
money demand.  Here yt is a proxy mea-
sure of the transactions that money facil-
itates and Rt is an (overly simple) measure
of the opportunity cost of holding money
rather than some other asset.  In an actual
application, some account might have to
be taken of technical progress in the pay-
ments process, but for present purposes
that complication is unnecessary.  The ﬁrst
basic point to be made is that if we append
equation 4 to the system (equations 1-3), it
plays no essential role.  It merely determines
how much money has to be supplied by 
the central bank in order to implement its
interest rate policy rule, equation 3.  The
system (equations 1-3) determines the same
values for Dpt, yt, and Rt whether equation 
4 is recognized or not, presuming that 
_
yt
and gt are exogenously given.  This is the
basic point that has led many researchers to
ignore money and, indeed, that has led the
staff of the Fed’s Board of Governors to con-
struct a large, sophisticated, and expensive
new macroeconometric model that does not 
recognize money in any capacity.11 But is 
the point valid?
Evidently, there are at least two require-
ments for it to be valid.  First, the central
bank of the economy being modeled actually
conducts policy by manipulating a real-world
counterpart of Rt, while paying no decisive
attention to current movements in mt.  It 
is widely agreed that this is the case for the
United States and most other industrialized
nations, including Germany.12 Second, it
must be the case that mt does not appear in
correctly speciﬁed versions of either equa-
tions 1 or 2.  With respect to the latter, that
condition would seem to be satisﬁed; but 
for the expectational IS function 1 it is 
more problematical.  What is required in a
mainstream theoretical analysis13 is that the
transaction-cost function, which describes
the way that money (the medium of
exchange) facilitates transactions, must be
separable in mt and the spending variable
such as yt.  But there is no theoretical reason
for that to be the case and it clearly is not the
case for my own preferred speciﬁcation.  So
what is actually being assumed implicitly, by
analyses that exclude mt (i.e., mt – pt) from
the relation 1, is that the effects of money
holdings on spending are quantitatively small
(indeed negligible).  This is a belief with a
long tradition, and I am inclined to think that
it is probably justiﬁable, but the whole matter
needs additional study.
One of the fortuitous events that led to
today’s era of cooperation between central-
bank and academic economists was the
publication of a 1993 paper by John
Taylor—the one in which he explicitly
proposed the now famous Taylor rule.  By
writing his rule in terms of the instrument
actually used by central banks and expressing
his formula with brilliant simplicity, Taylor
made the concept of a monetary rule more
palatable to central bankers—especially as 
he showed that recent U.S. experience had 
in fact conformed to his formula rather
closely.14 Simultaneously, the step was attrac-
tive to academics because it enabled them
both to simplify their analysis, by discarding
money demand functions, and also to be
more realistic.
The precise rule proposed by Taylor
(1993) for the U.S. economy is as follows:
(5)  Rt = Dpt
a + 0.5 (Dpt
a - p
*) + 0.5  , yt + – r. 
Here Dpt
a is the average inﬂation rate 
over the past four quarters—a proxy for
expected inﬂation—and , yt is yt - 
_
yt, the
output gap.  For – r, the average real rate 
of interest, Taylor assumed 2 percent 
(per year) and for the inﬂation target p
*
he also assumed 2 percent.  So he actually
wrote the expression, with p denoting
inﬂation, y denoting , y, and r instead of R,
as follows: r = p + 0.5y + 0.5(p –2)+ 2.  In
thinking about this rule, it is important 
to recognize that it does not involve the
fallacy of using a nominal interest rate as
an indicator of monetary tightness or ease.
11See Brayton, et. al. (1997).
12On this point, see Clarida and
Gertler (1996).
13Such as that of Walsh (1998)
or McCallum and Goodfriend
(1987).
14It also helped, I am sure, 
that he emphasized that 
rule-like behavior does not
require literal, strict adherence
to a speciﬁed formula.Rather, it compares the real rate Rt- Dpt
a
with its long-run equilibrium value –rand
adjusts the former upward if the current
situation, represented by 0.5 (Dpt
a- p
*)+
0.5 ,yt, calls for a tighter stance.
To illustrate the workings of the Taylor
rule we can look at a diagram, similar to one
recently constructed by Taylor (1999), that
compares actual historical values of the U.S.
federal funds rate with values that would
have been dictated by the rule during the
years 1960-98.  In Figure 1 we see that the
two curves agree very closely during the
years 1987-94, but disagree sharply for the
period from 1965-78, with the Taylor rule
calling for much tighter policy through most
of that period.  Both of these comparisons
are quite encouraging for the Taylor rule, for
mostanalysts would now agree that U.S.
policy was quite good during 1987-94 and
considerably too loose during 1965-78.
If you ﬁnd the Taylor rule interesting,
you can always keep up to date on its advice
by going to the web site of the St. Louis Fed.
In the publication entitled Monetary Trends,
the bank plots a different but related diagram
that shows what the implicit inﬂation target
of the Fed has been recently, according to 
the Taylor rule, and recent values of the fed-
eral funds rate.  The diagram available in
February 1999 shows that as of mid-1998
the implicit target was about 1 percent inﬂa-
tion.  Thus, the Taylor rule indicates that the
recent U.S. monetary stance has been slightly
more restrictive than one that would yield 2
percent inﬂation, the value that most ana-
lysts consider to best represent the Fed’s
actual (although unstated) inﬂation target.
On the same page of Monetary Trends
there is another chart that pertains to a dif-
ferent rule, one that I am happy to say is
known as the McCallum rule.  It is entirely
appropriate that my rule appears after Tay-
lor’s, because his is much more popular
with both central bankers and academics.
A major reason is that mine is expressed in
terms of settings for the growth rate of the
adjusted monetary base—currency plus
bank reserves—rather than any interest
rate.  Therefore, Taylor’s is much more
realistic in the sense of pertaining to the
central bank’s actual instrument variable.
In fact, many central bankers view discus-
sions of the monetary base with about the
same enthusiasm as I would have for the
prospect of being locked in a telephone
booth with someone who had a bad cold,
or some other infectious disease.
That does not necessarily mean, how-
ever, that a base-oriented rule will give
poorer advice concerning monetary policy.
Historically, my rule—which adjusts the
base growth rate up or down when nom-
inal GDP growth is below or above a
chosen target value15—has agreed with 
Taylor’s over many periods.  But, they dif-
fered in the United Kingdom during the
late 1980s when mine would have called
for tighter policy and Taylor’s for looser.
Since that was a period during which U.K.
inﬂation rose rather rapidly—after having
been temporarily subdued by the onslaught
of Margaret Thatcher—this episode is one
that can be pointed out, when I want to
argue the merits of my rule.
I also must say that it would be very
wrong to interpret this contrast of rules as
representing a dispute between Taylor and
me.  I believe that the two of us are striving
for basically the same policy goals:  a stable,
rule-like monetary policy designed to keep
inﬂation low and to do what little it can to
stabilize real output ﬂuctuations.  Further-
more, I am conﬁdent that he shares this
belief.  And I certainly have no hesitation 
in saying that he has been the more effective
spokesman for our cause.
15The target value Dx* equals
the desired average rate of
inﬂation plus the expected long-
run average rate of growth of
real output—say, 2.0+ 2.5
= 4.5percent per year (or
0.01125 in quarterly fractional
units).  Then the rule is Dbt=
Dx* -Dva
t+ 0.5(x*t-1
– xt-1) where btand xtare
logs of the base and nominal
GDP while Dva
tis the aver-
age rate of growth of base
velocity over the previous four
years.  Also, x*tis the target
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0That said, in closing I would like to
apply our two rules to the extremely impor-
tant case of Japan during the 1990s.  To do
this with the Taylor rule requires us to adopt
values for p
*and r–, the inﬂation target and
the long-run average real interest rate.  For
the former, I again will take 2 percent in
measured terms (which probably overstates
the actual inﬂation rate in Japan by about 1
percent).  For  r–, Taylor’s (1993) procedure
was to use a number close to the long-run
average rate of output growth.  At present,
this is hard to judge in Japan but I will use 
3 percent since output grew at a rate of 4
percent over 1972-92.  Estimating the
output gap is even more difﬁcult, but here
my procedure is to ﬁt a trend line for 
_
ytover
1972:1-1992:4, and then to assume a growth
rate of 
_
ytequal to 2.5 percent since 1992:2.16
The results of this exercise are shown 
in Figure 2.  That policy needed to be much
tighter over 1972-78 shows up clearly, and
that policy was on track or somewhat too
tight over 1982-87 is suggested.  But our
main interest resides in more recent policy.
Figure 2 indicates that it was about right
over 1988-93, but, except for 1997, 
has been too tight since 1994.  At the end 
of 1998, the call rate was slightly over 3 
percent too high, the rule-indicated value
being –3.0 percent.  Of course this latter
value is not feasible, but it indicates that the
rule calls for much more stimulative policy
than what actually prevailed in late 1998.17
Now let us see what the McCallum
rule has to say.  For this exercise I adopt
the same value of p
*and use 3 percent as
the long-run average growth rate of real
output, yielding a nominal GDP growth
target of 5 percent per year or Dx
*= 0.0125
in quarterly log units.  The results of this
exercise are shown in Figure 3, with the
base growth rates expressed in per-annum
percentage points.  Here, when the solid
rule-suggested values are greater than the
dotted actual values for base growth, the
indication is that policy should have been
looser.  Thus, we see that this rule agrees
with Taylor’s regarding 1972-78 and 1994-
98.  It suggests that policy was too loose
on average over 1986-89 (when U.S. poli-
cymakers were encouraging a weaker yen).
And regarding the more recent period,
Figure 3 agrees that policy has been too
tight during 1994-98 but suggests that 
this period of monetary stringency began
several years earlier—around the middle 
of 1990.
I believe that most academic analysts
quite recently have come to share the view-
point indicated in this last picture, i.e., that
Japanese monetary policy has been too tight
since the early 1990s.  It is extremely unfor-
tunate for Japan and perhaps for the world
that this view did not prevail sooner.  In fact,
it did prevail among economists of a mone-
tarist or semi-monetarist persuasion.  My
own small contributions are mentioned in
footnote 19.  More prominently, the written
contributions of Goodfriend (1997) and
16This is in my opinion a weak-
ness of the Taylor rule; knowl-





assert that negative nominal
interest rates are impossible.  
I believe that statement is too
strong, partly for reasons indi-
cated by Thornton (1999).
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Figure 3
McCallum Rule and Actual Values for  
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–10Taylor (1997) called for greater monetary
stimulus by Japan, including, if necessary,
purchases of foreign exchange or non-tradi-
tional assets.18Milton Friedman’s Wall Street
Journalarticle of December 1997 put forth 
a similar position quite strongly, as did 
Allan Meltzer’s piece in the Financial 
Times(1998).
During the years 1995-98, however, 
it was orthodox opinion in the ﬁnancial
press—including the Financial Timesand
The Economist—that monetary policy
could provide no more stimulus in Japan
“because interest rates were already as low
as they could go.”  This view was not chal-
lenged by most academics.  Figure 3,
however, indicates that a policy rule that
uses the monetary base as an essential
variable would have been giving signals
indicative of overly tight policy for years, if
anyone had bothered to look.19The Taylor
rule concurs, but it did not begin to give
these signals until later—and also does not
agree regarding the period 1986-89.  My
conclusion is that one does not have to be
an opponent of the Taylor rule or the ana-
lytical framework shown in equations
1-3—which I am not—to believe that
there remains an extremely important role
to be played by measures of the monetary
base and other monetary aggregates.  I
would like to believe that Homer Jones
would have approved of this conclusion.
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